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Article 6

A RESPONSE TO GREGORY CLARK
A God of Peace and Love? - Reflections From a Biblical Scholar
Karla G. Bohmbach
As a member of this journal's editorial board, one of my
duties is to read and evaluate articles submitted for
publication as they are sent my way by the editor, Tom
Christenson. When I read Gregory Clark's article, I thought
definitely that we should publish it. My main comment to
Tom was that it would be greatly desirable to solicit
respondents who might interrogate further the practicality of
Clark's proposal for church-related colleges. In the back of
my mind, as I made that comment to Tom, I thought of how
much I was looking forward to reading such responses when
the issue came out. Tom had other ideas. He requested a
response from me. What has resulted is actually some
questions, derived mainly from my work as a scholar of
biblical studies. I hope such questions prompt further
comment- and further questions! - from readers.
Gregory Clark affirms the stance taken by John Milbankthat all philosophies and institutions, whether ancient,
modem, or postmodern, are built on an ontology of violence.
In this way a critique is made of Alasdair Maclntyre's
position concerning the postmodern liberal university, which,
for MacIntyre, would be a place of constrained agreement
(and so, presumably, non-violent). The problem for Clark,
who is following Milbank here, is that such a university,
insofar as it engaged with other "institutionalized versions of
moral enquiry" would remain within an ontology of violence.
For these engagements would be managed dialectically, and
dialectics can never lead to harmony but, at most, only a sort
of managed conflict which, in the end, is still violent.
Instead of an ontology of violence, Clark desires an ontology
. of peace. He argues that such an ontology of peace is to be
found in the person of Jesus, the person who preeminently
reveals "the God who is love and peace." As a biblical
scholar, my reaction is to interrogate the ways in which
Jesus did, and did not, reveal such a God.
Jesus lived in a violent world. And far from shying away
from that world and its violence, he seems to have
deliberately opened himself up to it. Although his message
was greeted frequently with suspicion, skepticism, and
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vilification, he did not back down or retreat from it, even
when, as one account has it, the people of his own hometown
attempted to kill him (Luke 4: 14 - 30). Eventually he set his
face toward Jerusalem, even though he knew the sharp
opposition facing him there from the religious authorities.
And, once in Jerusalem, he engaged in an act that most see
as the precipitating event of his final suffering: the
overturning of the moneychangers' tables in the Temple
itself. Although it may not have been as physically violent as
has been depicted in such movies as Jesus Christ Superstar,
the act at least had overtones of violence. Not only, then,
does Jesus receive violence onto himself, here, at least, he
actually imposes it on others. Jesus' violence begets further
violence, now enacted against him, as he is arrested, tried,
scourged, and crucified - a sequence of events which, by
all accounts, was horrifically violent.
Not only was violence a part of Jesus' life, he also warned
his followers that such would be their fate:
"Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth;
I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have
come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against
her mother and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law;
and one's foes will be members of one's own household"
(Matt. 10: 34-36; cf. Luke 12: 51-53).
If, indeed, the God who is found in Jesus is a God of love
and peace, it seems that the love and peace comes about in
and through the acceptance of violence- and the suffering
that often accompanies such violence. The events of the
Passions, which lie at the very center of Jesus' life and
mission, are an overwhelming witness to Jesus' ready
acceptance of, and patient bearing of, the violence being
inflicted upon him. Followers of Jesus forget this at their
own peril, for the message to them, too, is that if love and
peace will be constitutive of their lives, such will not occur
unaccompanied by, or exclusive of, violence.
If we do as Gregory Clark urges us to do, and proclaim
Jesus on our campuses, what would that look like? In
particular, what would it mean if we took to heart the Jesus
who made himself vulnerable to the violence of his world?
We, too, live in a violent world. Dare we look unblinkingly
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college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the
words.

into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and
even, if called upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way
because ofit? As staff, administrators, and teachers on

WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT
Richard Yivisaker

PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES

Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which
Transcends Special Interests.
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit ofpower on behalf of a
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades
itself daily.2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw
one.

(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.

(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.

We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity.
Diversity may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It
contains the seeds ofdiscord and disintegration along with
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity
while threatening loss of vitality and decay.. Everything
depe11ds on the wedding of diversity to some unity of
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a
"presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition.

Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value,
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely
conceivable (ifconceivable at all). But this does not remove
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned
Plato.

A popular view ofPlato holds that his world view has had
a great and largely detrimental influence while being
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been
right. About everything? No. About some important things,
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief
consideration of some other points where Plato had an
insight that merits preserving.

Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures
awareness ofthe world is mediated by organs which register
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural
factors carried by language. The hope of liberating rational
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any
point ofview and thus god-like. But bridging differences in
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us.
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity.
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality

(2) If Politics Is To Be More Than A Struggle For
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